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A.V. V. IPARADIGMS, LLC

562 F.3D 630 (4TH CIR. 2009)
I. INTRODUCTION

In A. V. v. iParadigms, LLC, four high school students who

submitted written assignments to the online plagiarism detective
service, Turnitin.com, brought a copyright infringement action
against iParadigms, the operators of the service.' iParadigms
brought counterclaims alleging one of the plaintiffs accessed its
online database without authorization in violation of the Computer
Fraud and Abuse Act ("CFAC") and the Virginia Computer
Crimes Act ("VCCA").2 The United States District Court for the
Eastern District of Virginia granted summary judgment in favor of
iParadigms on the copyright claim based on the doctrine of fair
use, and granted summary judgment in favor of the plaintiffs on
iParadigms' counterclaims, concluding that iParadigms did not
provide enough evidence to support actual economic damages.3
The parties cross-appealed and the Fourth Circuit affirmed the
summary judgment order on the copyright infringement claim, but
reversed and remanded the summary judgment order regarding
iParadigms' counterclaims.'

1. A.V. v. iParadigms, LLC, 562 F.3d 630, 634 (4th Cir. 2009).
2. Id.
3. id.
4. Id.
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II. BACKGROUND

iParadigms owned and operated "Turnitin Plagiarism Detection
Service," an online system to analyze written works to detect and
prevent plagiarism.' The service provided high school and college
educators verification of their students' original work.6 Typically,
students submitted their work through www.turnitin.com or
through their school's computer system.7 In order to submit
papers, students entered a password supplied by their instructor.8
The Turnitin system compared the students' work against other
student submissions and a database of journal articles and
periodicals.9 The system generated an "Originality Report" for the
instructor suggesting whether a percentage of the work may not be
original.'" Participating schools also had the option of archiving
the students' work within the Turnitin system. If participating
schools chose to do so, the students' work was archived and
became part of the database that Turnitin used to determine
originality of other students' work. 1 In order for students to
register and submit their work to the Turnitin system, they had to
create a profile and click "I Agree" to the Turnitin terms of
service, which contained language absolving iParadigms of any
liability related to the use of the system. 12
At the time of litigation, the four plaintiffs were students of high
schools that required submission of written work to Turnitin in
order to receive credit.' 3 The schools also elected to use the
archiving option.' 4 Three plaintiffs submitted their work to
Turnitin with a disclaimer objecting to the archiving of their
works, but the works were archived despite the disclaimer. 5 The
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. A. V., 563 F.3d at 634.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id. at 634.
12. Id. at 635.
13. A. V., 563 F.3d at 635.
14. Id.
15. Id.
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fourth plaintiff, A.V., submitted his work to Turnitin using a
password designated for students enrolled in the University of
California, San Diego (UCSD) with a password provided by
counsel. 16
The district court granted summary judgment to iParadigms
based on the fact that the students clicked on "I Agree" when
enrolling in the Turnitin system, thereby agreeing to the terms of
service and effectively shielding iParadigms from any liability.17
Further, the district count found that the disclaimers attached to the
students' submission did not alter the agreement.18 Additionally,
the district court found that iParadigms' actions qualified as "fair
use" under 17 U.S.C § 107.19 The district court based its finding
on the determination that the comparative nature of iParadigms'
usage was transformative and did not impair the market value of
the work.2
The district court dismissed both of iParadigms' counterclaims
based on the determination that there was no evidence to support
actual economic damages arising from the alleged violations of the
CFAA and VCCA.2" Plaintiffs and defendants cross-appealed the
district court's holding to the Fourth Circuit.22
III. LEGAL ANALYSIS

A. Plaintiff's Appeal - CopyrightInfringement Claim
The Fourth Circuit first considered the district court's summary
judgment order as to the plaintiffs' copyright infringement claim.23
The court outlined the statutory basis of copyright law and the
doctrine of fair use through the four-factor test enumerated in
section 107 of the Copyright Act.24
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 636.
A. V, 563 F.3d at 636.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
17 U.S.C. § 107 (2006).
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The court, explaining the basis of copyright law, pointed to the
exclusive rights enumerated in section 106 of the Copyright Act
including "the right to copy, the right to publish and the right to
is
distribute an author's works. ' 25 Also, included in these rights 26
the ability to display, perform, and prepare derivative works.
Importantly, the court noted these rights become those of the
author's from the time of creation.2 ' Further, "[a]nyone who
violates any of the exclusive rights of the copyright owner, that is
anyone who trespasses into his exclusive domain by using or
authorizing the 28use of the copyrighted work ... is an infringer of
the copyright.
The court noted that there were several exceptions to these rights
as enumerated in secition 107 through section 122 of the
Copyright Act. 29 Of these exceptions, the court focused its
analysis on section 107, which codified the doctrine of fair use.3 °
Fair use "allows the public to use not only facts and ideas
contained in a copyrighted work, but also expression itself in
certain circumstances."'" The preamble of section 107 states "the
fair use of a copyrighted work ...for purposes such as criticism,
comment, news reporting, teaching (including multiple copies for
classroom use), scholarship, or research is not an infringement of
copyright." 32 Section 107 lists the following four nonexclusive
factors for courts to consider when determining fair use:
(1) the purpose and character of the use, including
whether such use is of
a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational
purposes;
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work;
(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion
used in relation to the
25. A.V., 563 F.3d at 636 (citing Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation
Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 547 (1985); 17 U.S.C. § 106).
26. Id. (citing 17 U.S.C. § 106).
27. Id. (citing Harper& Row, 471 U.S. at 547).
28. Id. (quoting Sony Corp. of America v. Universal Studios, Inc., 464 U.S.
417, 433 (1984)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
29. Id. at 637.
30. Id. at 637-45.
31. A.V., 563 F.3d at 637 (quoting Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 219
(2003)).
32. Id. (quoting 17 U.S.C § 107).
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copyrighted work as a whole; and
(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market
for or value of the copyrighted work. 3
The court emphasized that the question of whether a work would
be considered fair use required a case-by-case analysis and that the
statutory factors should not be "treated in isolation" but "weighed
together, in light of the purposes of copyright.

34

1. FirstFactor- Purpose and Characterof the Use
The Court first applied the plaintiffs claim to the first factor of
the fair use test: "the purpose and character of the use, including
whether such use is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit
educational purposes."35 The court noted that using copyrighted
material for commercial purposes "tends to weigh against a finding
of fair use.

'36

Further, "[t]he

crux of the profit/nonprofit

distinction [was] not whether the sole motive of the use [was]
monetary gain, but whether the user [stood] to profit from
exploitation of the copyrighted material without paying the
customary price."37
In considering the character of iParadigms' use, the court stated
that the goal of an analysis of the first factor should be to
determine whether the use "merely supersed[ed] the objects of the
original creation, or instead add[ed] something new, with a further
purpose or different character.

38

Plaintiffs argued that the district court's analysis was flawed for
not recognizing the commercial nature of iParadigms' usage of the
copyrighted material.39 The plaintiffs emphasized that iParadigms

33. Id. (quoting 17 U.S.C § 107).
34. Id. at 638 (quoting Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569,
578 (1994)).
35. Id. (quoting 17 U.S.C § 107(1)).
36. Id. (quoting Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 562).

37. A.V., 563 F.3d at 638 (quoting Harper& Row, 471 U.S. at 562).
38. Id. (quoting Campbell, 510 U.S. at 578-79).
39. Id. The district court analyzed this factor with a focus on whether the use
was transformative, and found that iParadigms used the students' work for an
entirely different purpose by preventing plagiarism and provided a "substantial
public benefit," thus becoming "highly transformative" and weighing in favor of
fair use. Id.
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generated millions of dollars in revenue while accumulating an
ever-growing database of students' work."° To emphasize the
importance of this point, the plaintiffs looked to the Supreme
Court's language that "every commercial use of copyrighted
material is presumptively an unfair exploitation of the monopoly
privilege that belong to the owner of the copyright."'" For these
reasons, the plaintiffs contended that iParadigms' usage could not
constitute fair use as outlined by section 107.42
In response, the court noted that the district court did recognize
that iParadigms' use was commercial and relied on the Supreme
Court case, Sony Corp. v. Universal Studios, Inc., which held that
commercial use of copyrighted material does not in itself preclude
a finding of fair use.43 However, the court noted that Sony also
found that, though commercial use generally does weigh against a
finding of fair use, it must "be weighed along with [the] other
factors in fair use decisions."44 The court concluded that the
district court correctly recognized the commercial nature of
iParadigms' usage and appropriately weighed it against the other
factors in accordance with Supreme Court precedent.45
Plaintiffs further argued that iParadigms' use could not be
considered transformative because they merely archived the work
without adding anything new.46
The court dismissed this
argument, stating that a work does not need to be altered to be
considered transformative and can be considered transformative if
the purpose or function is altered.4" Therefore, the fact that the
students' work was not altered did not preclude it from being
deemed transformative.48
Finally, plaintiffs argued that even if iParadigms had a
transformative purpose in archiving the students' work, it could
not be considered transformative because iParadigms did not
40. Id.
41. Id. (quoting Sony, 464 U.S. at 451).

42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.

Id.
A. V., 563 F.3d at 639 (citing Sony, 464 U.S. at 448).
Id. (quoting Sony 464 U.S. at 449 n.32).
Id.
Id.
Id. (citing Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.corn, Inc., 508 F.3d 1146, 1165

(9th Cir. 2007)).

48. Id.
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achieve its intended effect.4 9 Because iParadigms' system could
be circumvented by paraphrasing works in its database, it failed to
achieve its intended purpose and could not be considered
transformative. The court dismissed this argument, stating that a
fair use determination is not made solely on whether or not a
copyright use "perfectly achieves its intended purpose."51
According to the court, such a determination is outside the scope
2
of its analysis.
As such, the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's ruling
that iParadigms'
archiving of the students'
work was
transformative and "completely unrelated to the expressive
content" of the work.53
2. Second Factor- Nature of Copyrighted Work
The court next considered the second factor, pointing to the
Supreme Court's statement that "fair use is more likely to be found
in factual works than in fictional works. 54
Plaintiffs argued the district court misapplied this factor by
failing to consider that the students' works were unpublished. 5
They argued that because an author has "the right to control the
first public appearance of his undisseminated expression," a fair
use consideration should be narrower in scope. 6
Plaintiffs
contended that because this fact was omitted from the district
court's order, its analysis of the second factor was invalid. 7
In response, the Fourth Circuit dismissed Plaintiffs argument by
noting that the Supreme Court has instructed lower courts to resist
weighing each factor in isolation.
Further, it noted that the
Copyright Act specifically states that "[t]he fact that a work is
unpublished shall not itself bar a finding of fair use if such finding
49. A. V., 563 F.3d at 639.

50.
51.
52.
53.

Id. at 639-40.
Id. at 640.
Id.
Id.

54. Id. (quoting Stewart v. Abend, 495 U.S. 207, 237 (1990)).

55.
56.
57.
58.

A. V., 563 F.3d at 640.
Id. (quoting Harper471 U.S. at 555).
Id.
Id. (citing Campbell 510 U.S. at 578).
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is made upon consideration of all above factors."59
3. Third Factor- Amount and Substantialityof the Portion Used
In weighing the third factor, the court considered "the amount
and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted
work as a whole."6 ° It noted that generally "as the amount of the
copyrighted material that is used increases, the likelihood that the
use will constitute a 'fair use' decreases."61 Given that, the court
also noted that although "[c]opying an entire work weighs against
finding a fair use

. . .

it does not preclude a finding of fair use,"

and the amount of allowed copying is related to the purpose and
character of the use.62

Plaintiffs contended that the district court, by referring to the
transformative nature of the work, erred in its analysis of the third
factor, effectively merging the analysis of the first and third
factors.63 The Court noted the overlap between the first and third

factors in that both considered the intended purpose of the use;
nevertheless, it found no error in the district court's analysis. 4
4. Fourth Factor- Effect on PotentialMarket
The Court finally considered the fourth factor to determine "the
effect of the use upon the potential market for or the value of the
copyrighted work."65 The Court emphasized that "a use that has
no demonstrable effect upon the potential market for, or the value
of, the copyrighted material need not be prohibited in order to
protect the author's incentive to create." 66

The court began its analysis by noting the overlap of this factor
and the first factor, specifically that transformative works do not
59. Id.(quoting 17 U.S.C § 107).
60. Id. at 642 (quoting 17 U.S.C. § 107(3)).
61. A. V., 563 F.3d at 642 (quoting Bond v. Blum, 317 F.3d 385, 396 (4th Cir.

2003).
62. Id.(quoting Sundeman v. The Seajay Soc'y, Inc., 142 F.3d 194, 205-06
(4th Cir. 1998)).
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id.(quoting 17 U.S.C. § 107(4)).
66. Id.at 642-43 (quoting Sony 464 U.S. at 450).
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supplant the copyrighted work in the marketplace and are
protected, even when the effect is harm to the market for original
work.67

Plaintiffs argued that the district court did not consider the
"potential market" for their works in determining that there was no
adverse effect.6" The court disagreed, noting that the district court
considered the potential market for the students' work too
speculative and that plaintiffs themselves stated that they would
not engage in the selling of their work to other students.69
Additionally, the court reasoned that because the use was
transformative and the Turnitin system merely suppressed demand
for the market of student created work, no market substitute was
created.7 The court noted that such an economic harm is not the
type protected by copyright law.7
The Fourth Circuit concluded that in light of the above analysis,
iParadigms' use of the student's copyrighted work constituted "fair
use" and the district court properly issued summary judgment on
the copyright infringement claim.72
B. Defendant's Counterclaims
The court next considered the appeal of the counterclaim by
iParadigms against plaintiff A.V. under the Computer Fraud and
Abuse Act ("CFAA").7 3
iParadigms alleged that A.V., by accessing Turnitin through a
67. A.V., 563 F.3d at 643. See Sundeman, 142 F.3d at 207; Davis v. The
Gap, Inc., 246 F.3d 152, 176 (2d Cir. 2001).
68. Id. The district court based its determination that there was no adverse

market effect on (1) the plaintiffs' own testimony that the marketability of their
works had not been harmed; (2) the lack of the plaintiffs' intention to sell their

works to other students; and (3) the fact that the archiving of the plaintiffs' work
would not cause any harm to them in the college admissions process. Id. at 64344.
69. Id. at 643-44.
70. Id. at 644.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 645.
73. A. V., 563 F.3d at 645. The CFAA, primarily a criminal statute, allows
for a private party who "suffers damage or loss by reason of violation of this
section . . . to obtain compensatory damages and injunctive relief or other
equitable relief." 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (2006).
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password intended for UCSD students, violated section
1030(a)(5)(A)(iii) prohibiting any person from "intentionally
access[ing] a protected computer without authorization, and as a
result of such conduct, caus[ing] damage."74 iParadigms submitted
evidence to support its claim that once it determined that a user
was able to access Turnitin as a student of a university that he did
not attend, it expended numerous man hours to determine the
75
source of the glitch.
iParadigms argued and the court agreed that the ordinary
meaning of "economic damages" should be used in the application
of section 1030(g) and that the district court considered the
provision too narrowly.76 The court determined that the broad
language of section 1030 (e)(l 1) included the costs incurred by
iParadigms in response to a suspected violation of the CFAA.77 In
light of this finding, the court remanded the counterclaim without
expressing an opinion as to whether the costs incurred by
iParadigms were reasonable, adequately proven, or indirectly
linked to the alleged CFAA violation."7
In its second counterclaim, iParadigms asserted that A.V.
violated the Virginia Computer Crimes Act ("VCCA").79 The
VCCA states that "[a]ny person who uses a computer or computer
network, without authority and.. . [o]btains property or services
by false pretenses . . . is guilty of the crime of computer fraud."8
The VCCA entitles anyone who is injured by a violation of the
statute to "sue ...and recover for any damages sustained and the

74. Id. (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(5)(A)(iii)).
75. Id.
76. Id. at 646. The district court found that as a matter of law, the
iParadigms counterclaim was insufficient because § 1030(g) limits violations of
the CFAA to economic damages. Here, iParadigms' labor expenses to find the
unauthorized access were merely consequential damages. The district court
implied in its analysis that the scope of "economic damages" under § 1030(g)
does not cover consequential damages. A. V., 563 F.3d at 646.
77. Id. Under the CFAA, "loss" is defined as "any reasonable cost to the
victim, including the cost of responding to an offense ....... 18 U.S.C. §
1030(e)(l 1).
78. A. V., 563 F.3d at 646.
79. A. V., 563 F.3d at 645.
80. VA. CODE ANN.§ 18.2-152.3 (2009).
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costs of the suit. 81
iParadigms contended that the district court incorrectly
interpreted the VCCA to exclude consequential damages from the
phrase "any damages" contained in the statute. 2 The court,
finding that nothing in the Virginia statute excluded consequential
damages, agreed with iParadigms and remanded the claim for
further consideration without expressing any opinion as to whether
actual damages were caused by the alleged violation. 3
IV. CONCLUSION

The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's summary
judgment in favor of iParadigms as to the plaintiffs' copyright
infringement claim. 4 The court upheld the district court's finding
that iParadigms' archiving of students' work for the purposes of
plagiarism detection was fair use, reasoning that it was
transformative, and although used commercial purposes, did not
harm the market value of the works.85 As to iParadigms'
counterclaims, the court reversed the district court's grant of
summary judgment to the plaintiffs.8 6 The court determined that
the district court did not properly consider damages to iParadigms
under the CFAA and VCCA and remanded for further
consideration.87
Robert A. Paul

81. VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-152.6 (2009).
82. A. V., 563 F.3d at 647. The district court granted summary judgment to
A.V. on the counterclaim, based on the reasoning that iParadigms did not
sufficiently present evidence of actual damages. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 638-45.
86. Id. at 646-47.
87. Id. at 647.
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